GOP Militarism is Propaganda, Not Strategy

The Islamic State (IS) was the most searched foreign policy issue last year and has been a focus of the GOP debates. But in the wake of the Republican candidates’ latest showdown, I felt no more confident that any of the candidates could solve this dilemma. On the contrary, it’s hard to help not feeling baffled and slightly disgusted by their oversimplified and unrealistic solutions to this and other serious foreign policy issues. For instance, consider the recent case of the US Navy ships that drifted, by their own navigation error, into Iranian territory and were temporarily detained. According to some GOP candidates, this annoyance is a symptom of diminished U.S military power. Of course this is nonsense, as is the idea that the proper reaction would be to use “the full force and fury of the United States.” Such retrogressive diplomacy is how small conflicts spiral into disasters. The candidates also treat IS as a threat that can be stomped out with brute force. Our engagement with the IS is cast primarily as a military conflict rather than a long term political struggle. In the world of the GOP, there is an immediate and definitive solution, and it can be fully achieved with weapons. In reality, they miss the crucial social element of counterinsurgency.

In the 5th GOP debate, Ted Cruz advocated for more air strikes on Raqqa while sidestepping the question of civilian casualties. He said that carpet bombing IS means, “using overwhelming airpower to utterly and completely destroy” it, which sounds effective until one realizes IS is headquartered in one of Syria’s largest cities. Meanwhile, Donald Trump vilifies Islam and wants a “shutdown” on Muslim immigration, which Jeb Bush rightfully pointed out will prevent America from forming a coalition with its Arab allies. These candidates effectively shorten their plans into 30-second blasts of bellicose rhetoric to rally their bases. Unfortunately, these invective streams have so condensed the real issues that any substance is lost. Their plans are militaristic; they envision winning the IS battle by force alone. But this is a recipe for disaster when confronting terror ridden societies. More attention needs to be given to basic governance and social issues that form the crux of any successful counterinsurgency campaign.

Fred Kaplan’s excellent summary of Obama’s foreign policy points out the current administration’s contradicting goals in Syria; ousting Assad and defeating IS. Achieving the former goal risks tearing open an even larger power vacuum in Syria for IS to exploit. Conversely, by leaving Assad in place for now, the Syrian army could help eradicate IS more quickly, especially when it’s backed by Russia. And however much the GOP lambasts Obama, they advocate for the exact same thing — removing Assad. But they should recognize that given that the instability in Syria first came from public opposition to Assad (now also from IS) and given the lack of a credible replacement for him, this goal is not currently advisable or even achievable. When terrorists infiltrate a society and try to assume state power, altering the remaining power structure requires an effective replacement; people need governance and rule of law to provide basic necessities, security, and to arbitrate disputes. Fighting Assad and IS at the same time takes a lot of resources and would remove a power structure that could be coordinated with to rebuild local security.

Is Assad too violent to be a responsible caretaker of Syria? Perhaps. Assisted regime change for the good of humanity has been called a just cause for war, and if so, this certainly applies to a dictator who uses chemical weapons against his own people. The Syrian government also contributes to regional contention by sticking its hands into Lebanese politics. It is a breeding ground for terrorism; Assad has supported Palestinian terrorist groups, Hezbollah, and at least passively allowed al-Qaeda cells to operate out of Syria. As long as Assad has had a hold on Syria, some jihadism has reared its head, serving his goals of using terror against Israel and forcing the West to engage with him to keep the region stable. However, once public opposition shook the foundation of Assad’s regime, this balancing act fell apart. So is it any wonder that jihadists already in Syria were able to establish a presence supplanting Assad? Keeping the despot around certainly won’t solve the long term potential for extremism in the region. But at this moment he is not the top priority; he is still a recognizable force within defined boundaries. IS, however, is a pandemic: a threat whose motives and presence are spreading outside the region.

With this backdrop and the fear it inspires, the GOP candidates’ reflexively heavy hands seem well-meaning. But introducing a strong ground force would be playing directly into the hands of IS. The group’s ideology would cause it to welcome a large conventional battle as a precursor to the caliphate sacking Istanbul and the initiation of the End of Days. Thus, a ground invasion would be a powerful propaganda tool for IS. An alternative strategy would be to slowly bleed the group and wait for support for the caliphate to drain away. But at what humanitarian cost?

According to prominent experts on IS’s ideology, some aspects of Islamic jurisprudence, including the continual obligation to wage offensive jihad against non-Muslim neighbors, comes into force only with the establishment of a caliphate, which requires holding territory. If a foreign ground force avoided a initial offensive in Dabiq, the alleged site of the apocalyptic battle, and instead focused on strongholds near Mosul, Fallujah, and Kirkuk, it might be able to drain IS support and resources first. It could then work its way from Iraq northeast to Aleppo and Dabiq. It would be in the Turkish President Erdoğan’s interest to aid forces attacking Aleppo and Dabiq from the north since, according to IS ideology, Istanbul is the next target, and indeed there have already been an attack linked to IS in Sultanahmet, one of the most historical and tourist heavy areas of Istanbul.

But without paying due attention to the people in the region, ground intervention could backfire. IS is a symptom of a broader social problem. While our top priority is stemming and stifling the organization in the region, stabilizing the humanitarian situation is just as crucial. The candidates generally do not discuss this latter point even though it is arguably the most important component of a lasting solution. America has already learned this in fighting terrorism in Afghanistan and Iraq; now is the time apply that experience.

Terrorism is certainly a nasty plight but if foreign “liberators” disregard the society they enter, they are won’t to be seen as more foreign than terrorists and vehemently rejected. In Afghanistan, America made headway by focusing on protecting and bolstering the population instead of bringing the battle to the enemy. Troops established a presence in towns, engaged the population, and involved them in public projects. They also helped train and equip local security forces so America’s could eventually withdraw without the enemy reinserting itself. And most importantly, they helped integrate national and local governments into a sustained system of support. The U.S tried a similar strategy in Iraq, albeit in a more complicated fashion because terrorism was set off and perpetuated by rampant sectarian conflict. The US soldier death rate in Iraq is a testament to this strategy; after the troop surge when US strategy turned population centric and US forces allied with Sunni tribes, casualties declined dramatically because they began working with instead of against the locals. Every local fighter won over is one less troop that must be sent in.

The American strategy in the Afghan and Iraq Wars can be used to extract IS but the current strategy must change. For one, securing the population will require in-house forces, not just airstrikes. Without cooperating with the Assad government, there is no coherent national force that can aid strengthen or train the population to defend themselves. There are diffuse rebel groups for sure, but they are being targeted on both sides by IS, Assad, Iran’s proxies, and supposedly, by Russian air strikes. Jeb Bush recommends rallying the moderates to replace Assad but if there was uncertainty in identifying moderates to give weapons to, there is surely uncertainty in identifying moderates to give a country to. This is the reason the United States has adopted an “Iraq first” strategy; however corrupt, there is at least a recognized government to work with in that country.

There are other problems with deploying ground troops to Syria. The first involves identifying the enemy. Assume a coalition ground force does enter the country and attempts to push IS out of a populated area. As David Kilcullen outlines in his book on counterinsurgency, The Accidental Guerrilla, there is no clear cut way to distinguish civilians from the enemy. People become “accidental” insurgents when they fight for IS, not because of a shared ideology, but because of coercion. It’s possible to win locals over but it would require engagement and security. Ground forces must win them over, but if they fight without discrimination, they will appear more lawless than IS, and locals will retaliate. It would be hard to see how people in the Middle East would trust the US to do this if it had a Donald Trump at the helm reducing people to and excluding them based on religious identity. Syrians and Iraqis are not just that, not just Sunni or Shia or Christian, and they are not always just IS.

Secondly, to secure a population’s trust, the coalition would need to provide for their basic survival. IS differs from Al-Qaeda in Iraq and the Taliban in Afghanistan because it has assumed a role of governance; it not only holds territory but administers it and provides services like food, water, electricity, and basic education. Not since World War II has American successfully restructured and entire country. Its military fights well but it does not nation-build well. Perhaps its failures come from lack of relevant training, lack of commitment or both. In any case, it should not consider entering the Middle East again in a serious way without both things and certainly not in the destructive fashioned pictured by the GOP, since doing so would render nation-building nearly impossible.

In sum, population engagement, factoring in governance, security, and resource control, are a core components of counterterrorism that ought not be forgotten. The hot rhetoric employed by the current crop of Republican presidential candidates may serve to quell Americans’ fear of another terrorist attack, but in their strongman act they will forget that in Syria and Iraq we are dealing with human beings who yearn for security and prosperity as much as any American.

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Tori Keller is a junior studying international relations.