Colombia’s Vote Against Peace was Far From a Failure

The Colombian people are no strangers to conflict. In the early 1960s, extreme economic disparity and United States-backed anti-communist repression led to the formation of a prominent leftist guerrilla group known as the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia). Since then, Colombia has been in a state of seemingly unending asymmetric civil war, causing many of its citizens to desire peace above almost all else. Recently, an opportunity presented itself: a peace accord between the country’s government and the FARC was finalized and signed in September 2016. And yet, after over fifty years of warfare and four years of negotiations, the Colombian people voted to reject it.

The 297-page peace accord was released to the public in August, and a plebiscite for its ratification took place on October 2, 2016. The question on the ballot was seemingly straightforward: “Do you support the final treaty for the termination of the conflict and the construction of a stable and lasting peace?” In response, voters could mark either “YES” or “NO.” But the country was fiercely divided over whether or not to approve the agreement. For some, the answer was simple: to vote “YES” was to vote for peace, and thus an obvious choice. For others, it was significantly more complicated: to vote in favor of the peace agreement was to forgive the guerrillas, to allow them to evade prison sentences regardless of crimes against humanity and to grant them political power, including seats in Congress.

Some favored the peace in full recognition of its shortcomings. For example, Colombian Stanford graduate student Daniel Hernandez saw the treaty as flawed but necessary.

“I wanted the ‘YES’ to win,” he said. “I knew the result of the negotiations maybe wasn’t the best, but it was the best [under the circumstances].”

Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos, a leading proponent of the peace agreement, shared a similar perspective. He has said that “perfect justice would not allow peace,” indicating that guerrilla leaders were unlikely to accept a treaty involving more severe forms of punishment.

Despite evident controversy, it seemed most Colombians agreed with the President, as the “YES” was poised to win. And yet, on October 2, (much like with Brexit and the US Presidential Election) the final results remarkably defied most polls. The “NO” vote triumphed, with a narrow majority of 50.2 percent of voters rejecting the treaty and 49.8 percent voting in favor.

To proponents of the “YES” vote — the peace accord’s supporters — this loss was not only concerning, but also a humiliating and disgraceful disaster. Outside Colombia’s borders, the international community was in a state of shock. How, many foreigners wondered, could a country’s people vote against their own peace? Against the end of war and turmoil? Martín Caparrós of the New York Times went so far as to label the incident “Colombia’s Proof That Democracy Doesn’t Work.” Both domestically and internationally, the plebiscite was perceived and portrayed as a failure.

But according to Guillermo Ruiz, a Colombian former visiting student researcher at Stanford’s Center for Latin American Studies, “[The plebiscite] wasn’t failed at all. This is a triumph of institutionality in which we are not using arms to solve the conflict, but we are using a constitutional mechanism to deepen democracy.”

Ruiz also explained that, per the Colombian constitution, plebiscites are plainly means for political participation, unlike referendums, in which citizens decide on specific constitutional modifications. The result of a plebiscite is solely binding for the executive branch and doesn’t restrict Colombia’s judicial or legislative branches of government. In other words, the plebiscite is primarily a way for the government to gauge public opinion on an important question, rather than a direct vote on a legally-binding decision.

“Now, the President is bound by the plebiscite to renegotiate the agreement,” Ruiz said.

And this was exactly the case. In light of the treaty’s rejection, the Colombian government and the FARC extended their ceasefire and put significant effort into renegotiating and revising with their opponents’ concerns in mind.

Grounds for Opposition

The reasons some Colombians opposed the initial treaty are manifold. Many simply felt they could not forgive the guerrilla, and believed the treaty was far too lenient in its punishment. Although the accord involved the FARC giving up its arms to the United Nations, the “transitional justice” offered by the Colombian government in return was concerning to some citizens. Under the agreement, guerrilla fighters who fully confessed their crimes would participate in “reparative and restorative” service work for five to eight years, but would not face prison sentences. A notable portion of “NO” voters were uncomfortable with this and called for harsher consequences for those guilty of crimes against humanity.

Surprisingly, those who were most directly affected by the conflict voted overwhelmingly in support of the treaty and were ultimately willing to forgive the FARC. Some argue this was because voters close to the conflict wanted a quick end to it, while those outside could afford to prolong the war for the sake of a marginally better agreement. According to political analyst Hernando Gómez Buendía, those in less-affected, urban areas were more concerned with specifics of the treaty impacting issues such as employment, transportation and inflation. Victims, on the other hand, saw the accord as an immediate, much-needed end to violence and suffering, regardless of clemency and concessions for the perpetrators.

But, Ruiz emphasized, there were exceptions.

“The most important counterexample is Bogotá, the capital. Bogotá experienced peace for many years and has forgotten what it is like to be at war. And in the plebiscite, the ‘YES’ won.”

Venezuelan Stanford sophomore Alex Trivella spoke with a number of Colombians living in his home country, most of whom were against the peace deal. Trivella said this was because of the precedent Venezuela set in regard to granting political power to radical leftist groups. Venezuela is currently in crisis, largely due to mistakes made by late socialist President Hugo Chávez, a long-time supporter of the FARC. Colombia’s peace deal allows the FARC recognition as a political party and grants them 10 seats in Congress. The deal’s critics are concerned about the possible consequences of giving so much power to the former rebels. They draw parallels with an episode when, a decade after overthrowing a dictatorship, Venezuela allowed Marxist guerrilla groups to identify as fringe political parties. This led to ardent divisions and a fractured political system, ultimately making way for the detrimental rise of Chavez in 1999.

“For the people I’ve spoken to, the fear is that granting amnesty to these FARC leaders and giving them political power could lead to a similar situation [to Venezuela],” Trivella said.

Others still doubted the peace deal’s ability to generate lasting peace, given how the FARC is only one component — albeit a crucial one — of the Colombian conflict. These voters felt the treaty should be improved before it was passed, and disagreed with the phrasing of the “YES” campaign that made it seem as though people were voting for or against peace itself. Colombian Stanford sophomore Romeo Umaña first heard about the accord from his mother, who was also in opposition largely because she wasn’t confident in the treaty’s efficacy.

“Some people just don’t think that this peace deal will bring peace,” Umaña said. “They think that people will just rise up with another group. A lot of people were worried that, even if FARC disappeared, there were still going to be other groups fighting.”

Although the FARC is arguably Colombia’s most prominent guerrilla group, another not included in the treaty is the ELN (National Liberation Army). The ELN announced in September that they are ready to commence peace talks with the government, having delayed negotiations since March. Nevertheless, while the accord would have certainly lessened the conflict, its promise of “stable and lasting peace” may have been a bit inaccurate due to the continued existence of other guerrilla groups. 

Unified Desire for Peace

What is crucial to recognize is that both “YES” and “NO” voters had the ultimate goal of a lasting peace. The difference between the two was whether the accord, as it was initially written, would be the best way to attain it. “NO” voters even adopted the slogan “Paz sí, pero NO así,” which translates to “Yes on peace, but not like this.”

In addition to the block of “NO” voters who wanted to see the peace accord rewritten, other voters were understandably overwhelmed by the vast amount of information in the treaty and felt they could not fully comprehend what they were being asked to approve. The length and complexity of the accord undoubtedly contributed to this confusion.

“When you have 300 pages and a month later you have the plebiscite, some people go, ‘Wait a minute. I don’t understand anything. I’ll just vote NO,’” Ruiz said.

Colombian Stanford freshman Cecelia Cavalier thought the high rate of abstention may have been due to a similar issue.

“People weren’t educated about [the agreement]and didn’t know what they were voting for,” Cavalier said. “It’s kind of like you don’t know your own power in your ability to vote and what that impact means.”

But why did the treaty’s creators decide to ask for the people’s opinion in the first place? The plebiscite was technically unnecessary, given that the treaty could have gone into effect without a vote for its approval. Caparrós of the New York Times criticized President Santos’ decision, calling it “the biggest mistake by a politician who has made a mountain of errors.”

“President Juan Manuel Santos could have made the agreement official without the need of a plebiscite, but he yielded to the temptation of obtaining, through this peace accord, the support of his fugitive voters,” Caparrós said.

In Colombia, peace is a constitutional right, which is why many felt it was the President’s responsibility to protect it at all costs, regardless of the outcome of a vote. In some way, the plebiscite didn’t make much sense — after all, Santos was elected by the Colombian people to make these very decisions on behalf of his country. Nonetheless, it seemed he wanted to ensure his constituents supported his chosen course of action, both to establish his credibility and promote a smooth implementation of the peace process. But the people — much to Santos’ surprise — voted “NO.”

Lingering Divisions

Regardless of whether or not the initial treaty was significantly flawed, it appears Colombia was not ready for its ratification. The controversial nature of the peace accord revealed intense divisions throughout the country — with only 50.2 percent of voters in opposition, 49.8 percent in favor, and a meager 37 percent voter participation, the “NO” vote only succeeded by an incredibly thin margin. Moreover, despite peace itself being almost universally desired, the peace process became a highly partisan issue. This was emphasized by current, Liberal Party President Juan Manuel Santos’ persistent commitment to the treaty, while former President Álvaro Uribe of the conservative Centro Democratico led the campaign for its opposition.

The divisiveness the plebiscite both encouraged and illuminated remains highly problematic, as the changes brought about by the accord will likely affect the great majority of the Colombian population and necessitates their cooperation. Colombia is the 11th most unequal country in the world, and such intense inequality was a key factor in the initial rise of the FARC. In order to both abate poverty and grant concessions to the largely rural, impoverished guerrillas, the peace treaty ensured reforms such as the redistribution of land that are meant to benefit Colombia’s poor. Because of this, most landowners and other members of Colombia’s wealthier classes were particularly opposed to the treaty.

Furthermore, Colombian business owners may be unwilling to hire ex-guerrillas, which would complicate their reintegration into society. The simple presence of former guerrilla soldiers, guilty of crimes as severe as murder and kidnapping, in day-to-day life is understandably enough to make many Colombians uncomfortable. Thus, it is questionable whether or not peace could have been successfully implemented with so much of the country either unsure or in opposition.

“What we have here is a peace process. And a peace process is not something where the government and guerrillas just sign an agreement. It means a whole change in the political system, even for citizens,” Ruiz said.

The process is so far-reaching that some “YES” supporters even believe it may have been for the best that the treaty was not approved with a similarly narrow margin. Hernandez said he felt this way on October 2, when the vote counts grew frighteningly close.

“I started saying: hopefully, the ‘NO’ wins. Because if the ‘YES’ wins in these conditions, that might mean something very terrible,” Hernandez said.

Had the “NO” lost under comparable circumstances, an aggressive reaction from the treaty’s opponents and their leaders was not improbable. Uribe’s “NO” campaign against the treaty was so severe, it is likely that the opposition would have demanded recounts and actively attempted to thwart the peace process in protest of the accord’s alleged flaws. Such actions would have undermined the treaty’s objectives and hindered the feasibility of peacefully reintegrating the FARC into Colombian society.

In contrast, “YES” advocates have proven to be primarily hopeful and perseverant in the face of defeat. Responses have ranged from peaceful demonstrations in part of Colombian citizens to the official revision of the accord by its creators, working in tandem with its critics. The updated treaty was approved unanimously by the country’s House of Representatives on November 30, 2016, one day after its approval in the Senate. Colombia is progressing toward unity and increased participation, and the goal is to achieve peace in such a way that will work for most — if not all — of the country’s citizens. 

A Stronger Democracy

Evidently, the treaty’s rejection has sparked significant discussion throughout the country. The unexpected outcome of the plebiscite has forced many to better understand the controversial agreement and possible next steps. Political participation in terms of voting may have been low, but the discourse has greatly increased. Regardless of the result, such dialogue is beneficial for Colombia, because its citizens are — in some way — experiencing democracy more fully.

“From my experience, I can say that we have never lived a real democracy in my country,” Ruiz said. “And I think that, right now, we are experiencing that. All of the people are talking about this, and there is no unified view of what is going on.”

Colombia was shaken by the rejection of the peace accord. Nonetheless, as Ruiz said, this is anything but a failure. A country riddled by seemingly interminable conflict has managed to sit down with its most prominent guerrilla group and negotiate terms for peace. The people are joining the discussion. They are listening to the treaty’s supporters and to the opposition. They are listening to each other. This may not have been the anticipated result, but Colombia has made unquestionable progress.

Ruiz, who voted in favor of the treaty’s approval and yearns for peace in his home country, remains highly optimistic in the aftermath of the plebiscite:

For me, it is not a crisis that we are experiencing. We are just experiencing the change, the peace. It is a process that gets into your bones, into your veins. And I find that peace is the purpose of my life.”

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Daniela Gonzalez is a sophomore studying computer science and English.

This article appears in the May 2017 issue of Stanford Politics Magazine.