A conversation with Ahmed Rashid

Ahmed Rashid is a Pakistani journalist and writer whose work focuses on bringing political landscape of Afghanistan and Pakistan to American readers. His books include Taliban and Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Disaster in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asia. He now regularly writes for international newspapers like the Washington Post and El Mundo. In 2001, he was awarded the Nisar Osmani Award for Courage in Journalism by the Human Rights Society of Pakistan.

In the transcript below, lightly edited for clarity, we interviewed him to discuss the recent military escalations between India and Pakistan in Kashmir.

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Vivan Malkani: At the heart of the recent military standoff between India and Pakistan there seems to be a lack of verified information. The Indian government reports multiple “surgical strikes” in Pakistani territory on military bases that kill several Pakistani soldiers (the term was originally used by Lt. Gen. Ranbir Singh, Director General of Military Operations, Indian Army). The Pakistani military denies any such strikes, and the Pakistani Foreign office asserts that the Indian attacks lead to the death of civilians, including women and children. Both governments have been pushed to more aggressive positions based on biased information. How can this information problem be resolved?

Ahmed Rashid: It has been very difficult for the Indian government to admit that this uprising in Kashmir, which has been going on since July, is an indigenous uprising. Their argument for Kashmir is that everybody is happy and that if there is trouble it’s been stoked up by Pakistan. By not admitting that there is an indigenous problem and pouring troops in (500,000–600,000 troops) points to a completely different scenario: that there is an uprising that must be contained. Now, I think it was stupid and shortsighted of whoever carried out the attacks, whether it was the LET (Lashkar-e-Taiba) or aided and abetted by Pakistani intelligence or if it was genuinely a militant group wanting to escalate the problem between the two countries.Whatever it was, these attacks went to the advantage of India and to the disadvantage of the Pakistani position.

What has stunned a lot of Indians and Pakistanis is the complete lack of will by Modi to actually address the internal Kashmir issue. The last government didn’t go very far, but there was at least the pretense or effort to actually talk to the Kashmiri leaders. We haven’t seen any of that, and I think this is the crux of the problem: India not being able to accept that there is an indigenous problem. Kashmiris are fed up with Indians either way you look at it.

VM: You mentioned in your article for the Financial Times on October 18th that the Modi administration is the first Indian government to “refuse dialogue with the Kashmiri population”. Why do you think Modi has made this decision, to completely cut off diplomatic dialogue with indigenous Kashmiris?

AR: It’s because I think it’s much easier for him to blame this on Pakistan. This is the line that this government wants to give. Pakistanis think that Modi has a very aggressive foreign policy towards Pakistan and this uprising and the subsequent attacks all fit the bill.

VM: Is there any possibility that the Indian military may be fabricating or exaggerating these attacks just to justify the extreme security measures put in place in Kashmir?

AR: It’s possible, I think both sides do a lot of exaggeration and fabrication since we never know the true figures or details of the attacks. The whole area is a military area, there’s no independent reporting from there, so we are obliged to listen to either the Indian or Pakistani army as to who started shelling first, how many civilians died, etc. This is a very ruinous game because you can never get to the bottom of it.

VM: One of the statistics mentioned in the Indian Express earlier this month was that there have been 110 ceasefire violations in the last 2 months at the LOC (Line of Control).The Hindustan Times reported that 99 of these violations have been started by Pakistan. Does this willingness to continue fighting and the rate of increasing violence, do you think a real threat of escalation exists? When do you think this will rise till?

AR: I think what suits Modi is that as long as the uprising in Kashmir continues, the tension on the Pakistani border continues too, thereby demonstrating to the Indian public that this is a Pakistani caused problem. I believe the moment the Kashmir uprising subsides, for whatever reason, you will see the border tension subside also. It’s all about the escalation in Kashmir itself by the Kashmiris. Modi wants a scapegoat, and that’s Pakistan, to show that the Kashmiris are not demonstrating because the want freedom or independence or whatever, but that they are demonstrating because they’re being told to demonstrate, by their “Pakistani Masters.”

VM: Another aspect of this I find very interesting and difficult to analyze is the US involvement in this issue. US military aid to Pakistan for “security purposes” has fallen significantly. [US civilian and military aid in 2016 to Pakistan is expected to total less than $1 billion, a massive decrease from 3.5 billion in 2011.] Recently, India’s relationship with the US has been improving. How do you think this American shift towards India will affect Indo-Pak relations?

AR: There’s a lot of concern in Islamabad about exactly what you described, this “tilt” towards India, and the retreat from Pakistan and Afghanistan. I think ultimately the Americans do want to get out of Afghanistan. Once they do that, the value of Pakistan to them is reduced even more. Secondly, the fact that Pakistan continues to give refuge to the Taliban has caused the Americans a great deal of frustration. India will remain a major economic power and so it will remain a home for investment and good relations, and of course the Americans want the Indians to stand up to the Chinese. Pakistan becomes a very secondary item, in comparison to India, China and the US.

Trump has no interest in this region whatsoever, other than economic interests in India. He has no strategic interests in the way that America has had a strategic interest in the region. This means that there won’t be any American attempt at mediation or anything like that. India will be treated as the ally and the other countries will by in large be forgotten, unless they became very provocative, like if Pakistan supports the Taliban in capturing Kabul, or something like that. Then the Americans might get re-involved.

VM: To wrap up, do you think that this escalation is different from previous escalations?

AR: As I said, I think this escalation is going to continue at this level, perhaps a slightly heightened level, until some kind of lowering of tension in Kashmir itself.

VM: You had also stated that Modi’s government refuses to engage in that dialogue. Do you think this will continue as long as Modi is in power?

AR: The military tension could be reduced, even without Modi talking to Pakistan. The military can be switched on and off very easily. It’s a totally controlled escalation that is going on right now. India fires 5 shots, Pakistan fires 5–10 shots. This very controlled environment that we’re in now can be wound down pretty quickly. With the UP elections coming up, there are all sorts of domestic factors which make Modi want to appear tough and strong. The other factor is that there has been a real escalation in spy wars. For example, Pakistan is convinced that India has plotted these bomb blasts in Balochistan, and the Indians are equally convinced that these attacks along the border are carried out with the support of the Pakistani state. That element is much more difficult to wind down, that is, the subterfuge and clandestine sabotage by intelligence agencies on either side.

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Vivan Malkani, a sophomore studying political science, is a staff interviewer at Stanford Political Journal.