Burma’s Difficult Path to Democracy

On November 8, Burma held its first relatively free and fair election in 25 years. Three months later, on February 1, the country swore in hundreds of new lawmakers in its new parliament. The people of Burma voted overwhelmingly for the main opposition party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), which ran on the simple slogan “Time for Change.” Led by veteran political dissident Aung Sung Suu Kyi, the party captured a decisive 80 percent of the contested parliamentary seats. The election was widely deemed competitive and legitimate; unlike in previous elections, ballot boxes were not stuffed and voters in rural regions were not forced to vote for the incumbent party. However, despite the NLD’s overwhelming victory, Burma faces substantial challenges ahead in its transition to democracy, ranging from the persecution of a Muslim minority to the continuation of a long civil war between the military and ethnic armed groups.

The NLD’s main opponent is the ruling Union Solidarity Development Party (USDP), a political vehicle of the military elite that has controlled Burma since a 1962 coup. Led by Army General Ne Win, a group of generals overthrew the democratically elected government, replacing it with a military junta. As a result, U Nu, the first Prime Minister of Burma under the 1947 Constitution of the Union of Burma, was removed from power. Shortly afterward, Ne Win and his Revolutionary Council wrote the Burmese Way to Socialism, a treatise aimed at promoting economic development, removing foreign influence, and increasing the role of the military. The harsh dictatorship endured until 2010 (aside from a short interlude in the 1980s) when the USDP instituted moderately liberal reforms. Claiming to act in the interest of national unity, the USDP’s corrupt and incompetent rule turned the relatively rich Southeast Asian country into one of the world’s most impoverished nations.

Additionally, the USDP’s centralizing policies exacerbated conflict with Burma’s ethnic minorities along the frontiers, prolonging the world’s longest running civil war. The ethnic strife originated from the political reordering after independence in 1948. Ethnic Burmans formed roughly two-thirds of Burma’s population, while the remainder comprised over a hundred groups, with the Shan, Karen, Rakhine, and Mon among the largest. When they realized would not be permitted to secede from the Union nor be granted autonomous rights as provided by the Constitution, ethnic minorities took up arms a decade later. Tensions between minority groups and the central government were also further fueled by centralization policies and government attempts to make Buddhism the state religion.

After a similar NLD landslide in 1990, the military vowed to hand over power to any government but backtracked months later. Many think the aftermath of the November 2015 elections will be different since the military has constitutionally-reserved powers allowing it to remain in politics. Nevertheless, the reestablishment of a functional democracy is not guaranteed. In the several months before the new administration forms, the incoming government and military will likely make some shrewd bargains with each other. The NLD’s ability to function smoothly will largely depend on its ability to co-exist with the military, given the military’s remaining institutional power. Thus far, the NLD seems to be acting cautiously and in favor of a smooth transition to power. Selected NLD officials have toed the party line, and Suu Kyi reached out to meet with President Thein Sein and Army Commander in Chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing — preludes to a important meeting with Sr. General Than Shwe. The former dictator has reportedly said he’d support Suu Kyi “as best as he can” and referred to her as Burma’s “future leader,” implying the military will honor the results.

In 2003, the USDP announced the “Roadmap to Democracy”, a 7-step program for Burma’s transition to a democratic state, and President Thein Sein launched a cautious process of reform in 2010. However, the ruler seemed reluctant to turn Burma into a full-fledged liberal democracy. The new, military-drafted constitution allows for some popular participation but ensures that the armed forces will retain control over important levers of power. First, the Constitution reserves 25 percent of seats in the national parliament for the military, 30 percent in regional parliaments. This gives the military the power of the veto because any constitutional change requires a supermajority of more than 75 percent of parliament. Second, three crucial and powerful security ministries — Defense, Border Affairs, and Homeland Affairs — can only be held by senior military officers. Third, the Constitution grants wide discretion to a powerful National Security Council, consisting primarily of military personnel, to participate in the national political leadership of the state. Due to these safeguards, generals likely deemed their power secure enough to allow for free elections without worrying about the outcome. Moreover, the 2008 constitution affirms a basic and flexible principle allowing “Defence Services to participate in the national political leadership of the state.”

Since Suu Kyi first emerged as the main opposition leader during the 1988 uprising against the junta, she has had a strong bond with the electorate. Her moral strength, story of self-sacrifice, and prestige as the daughter of the late General Aung San (who led Burma to independence from Great Britain in 1948) have made her an iconic figure in Burma. Many of the Burmese even refer to her in divine terms, such as “Mother” and “the Lady.” Nonetheless, Suu Kyi has various shortcomings: her programmatic vagueness, unwillingness to tolerate dissenting views and possible rivals, her reluctance to name a successor, hesitations to defend the Rohingya Muslims who are one of the world’s most persecuted groups, and her general authoritarian streak. Moreover, the scale of the NLD landslide and inability for any other party to come even close represents the threat of elective autocracy; the NLD overwhelming beat the USDP and ethnic minority parties, making it harder to conclude peace talks between the central government and ethnic separatist movements. This also impedes the development of an ideological pluralism necessary for a healthy, efficient democracy.

The impulse to celebrate “elections” merely because they happened overshadows the complexities of the country’s situation and the actual changes that need to be brought about. The elections took place in the context of the persecution of the stateless Rohingya Muslims, the displacement of over 600,000 Burmese citizens, and 11 armed revolts across the nation. Moreover, 4 million individuals were denied the vote, and the Ma Ba Tha, the extremist Buddhist military-backed movement, continues to grow in influence. Laws like the “Protection of Race and Religion,” which collectively violate internationally protected rights to privacy and religious belief and entrench discrimination against Muslims in particular, are some of the most discriminatory and exclusionary legislation in world. Fighting between the military and various ethnic armed groups continues, and leaves thousands dead and hundreds of thousands displaced and disenfranchised already. Ethnic political groups worry they’ll have little say in future peace negotiations and express distrust of Suu Kyi. And the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, reached in October, was only a partial success. Two years of discussions between the military-backed government and the coalition of ethnic armed groups only resulted in 8 more of the 24 active groups signing it. Without an end to the civil war, a smooth and real democratization process cannot be achieved.

Change in Burma must come from the Burmese themselves. During Ne Win’s harsh dictatorship, Burma was largely isolated from the world and had no relations with the United States. Following the military’s brutal suppression of student protests in August 1988, which killed over 3,000 and displaced thousands more, the United States imposed sanctions. U.S. sanctions, however, did not bring about the victory of the NLD. It is the Burmese people who deserve the credit. Now that Burma will likely receive reduced international attention and decreased United States involvement, it is up to the new government and the people of Burma themselves to resolve Burma’s longstanding issues. Collaboration and accommodation between the NLD and the military will be crucial for a smooth transition away from authoritarian rule. Given the enormity of the issues, from the persecution of Rohingya Muslims to ethnic tensions plaguing Burma, liberal democracy does not appear to be in the horizon. The burden therefore lies in the hands of the National League for Democracy to make actual, substantive change happen.