Stanford Politics

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n 2019, nuclear crises erupted around the world. In February, the United States withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), which had been the centerpiece of U.S.-Russia arms control over the past few decades. According to confidential United Nations report, North Korea had been “enhancing” its nuclear arsenal throughout the year. The Iranian government announced it would no longer be abiding by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action which placed restrictions on its uranium enrichment and production. Reports also claim that the Islamic republic is closer to developing nuclear weapon now than at any point in the last five years. Meanwhile, nuclear tensions have been escalating between India and Pakistan, with both countries growing their nuclear arsenals. President Donald Trump has indicated that he will not renew the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) with Russia, which resulted in historic reduction in the countries’ nuclear arms. The treaty placed a cap on the signatories’ arsenals, and resulted in the removal of about 80% of strategic nuclear weapons in existence. 

The world enters 2020 on the brink of a dangerous new nuclear age, in which there’s degradation of nonproliferation treaties and a reckless lack of respect for international nuclear norms. How did we get here?

The first domino to fall in this deteriorating nuclear landscape was arguably the violation of the landmark Budapest Memorandum negotiated between Ukraine, Russia, the U.S., among other major world powers. In 1991, when the Soviet Union collapsed, the new nation of Ukraine found itself with the third largest nuclear arsenal in the world on its territory. The priority for world powers, post-Cold War, was to make sure that there was no increase in the number of nuclear states; disarming Ukraine became pressing security concern. Washington and Moscow negotiated with Kyiv to transfer its nuclear arsenal to Russia. A key part of this arrangement was that, in their eagerness to neutralize a nuclear threat, the U.S., Russia, and the United Kingdom provided security assurances to maintain the territorial integrity of Ukraine. China and France also provided security assurances in a separate document. The Budapest Memorandum provided an assurance that the signatories would “respect the independence and sovereignty and existing borders of Ukraine” and “refrain from the threat or use of force.” In 2014, Russia violated those assurances made in Budapest Memorandum in its annexation of Crimea and invasion of eastern Ukraine. The other signatories consequently also violated the memorandum by failing to take action on behalf of Ukraine’s sovereignty. In a world where nuclear security is becoming an increasingly crucial foreign policy mission, trust between the major powers and nuclear nations is vital in order to make nuclear proliferation treaties effective. When the U.S. and Russia can blatantly violate such a landmark nuclear arms treaty, the trust between nations in arms control evaporates. How will we manage the growing nuclear crises when the credibility of international agreements is deteriorating?

Unless Ukraine’s territorial and security losses in the violation of the Budapest Memorandum can be reversed, Ukraine will become a prominent and convincing argument for smaller nations in favor of acquiring a nuclear arsenal. Security assurances are perhaps the most persuasive argument that the major powers can offer to persuade smaller countries to give up their nuclear arms. When the credibility behind these assurances falters, what incentives do countries such as Iran and North Korea have to give up their weapons? Several prominent Ukrainians have expressed regrets over signing over its nuclear weapons to Russia; Vladimir Ogryzko, Ukraine’s former foreign minister, has suggested that Ukraine should withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty and begin to build up its own nuclear arsenal. Similarly, Pavlo Rizanenko, Ukrainian member of parliament, stated plainly: “if you have nuclear weapons, people don’t invade you.” If Ukraine still possessed its powerful nuclear arsenal, it would still possess the Crimean peninsula. 

An appetite for developing nuclear weapons programs has been growing, even among U.S. allies. A U.S. partnership is no longer enough to deter proliferation. Saudi Arabia has shown an interest in enriching uranium, and there is significant support for developing a nuclear arsenal in South Korea as well. A growing fear of North Korea’s nuclear program may also pressure Japan to develop its own program.

Japan has long had the potential to go nuclear; they already have the knowledge and technology to develop these weapons. However, in a security treaty signed jointly with the United States in 1951, Japan agreed to remain non-nuclear power in return for a strong security assurance from the U.S. Washington promised that any attack on Japan’s territory will trigger retaliation from the United States. Japan has still seriously considered building nuclear weapons several times, most recently being in 2006 in response to North Korea’s growing arsenal. Yet every time, the Japanese concluded that they could trust the United States to keep its word and chose to rely on Washington’s security assurance. But in November of 2019, a Japan Times article explained that the nuclear weapons debate has become “especially salient” in Japan recently, and that there are concerns related to the U.S. “alliance commitments.” It’s clear that since the lukewarm U.S. response to Russia’s invasion of eastern Ukraine and annexation of Crimea, America’s security assurances no longer hold the same weight. 

Speaking at the Munich Security Conference on February 15, current Ukrainian president Zelenskyy perfectly encapsulates this growing sentiment. “No documents, no signatories, no memorandums can protect anyone. Honestly, my suggestion to all other countries from our own experience: all of you cannot trust any documents.” It may be too late for the signatories of the Budapest Memorandum, and the major world powers, to regain their credibility. However, it is crucial that they try. The United States, United Kingdom, and France and China (who similarly made assurances to Ukrainian territorial integrity) must finally retaliate with strength and assertion and prove to the international community that they can keep their word. While the U.S. has provided military aid to Ukraine and has worked with the European Union in imposing sanctions on Russia, it is clear that these meager slaps on the wrist did absolutely nothing to deter Russia from continuing to escalate the conflict on the eastern border. Six years later, Crimea remains occupied and the war wages on. It is absolutely crucial to the international order that the signatories live up to their assurances from the Budapest Memorandum and put an end to Putin’s ridiculous and illegal foray once and for all. Otherwise, there is no hope left for the credibility and value of nuclear arms agreements, and a new nuclear age of insecurity and escalation will begin. 

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Catarina Buchatskiy, a freshman, is a staff writer for Stanford Politics.