Stanford Politics

During the late twentieth century, Northern Ireland underwent a period of ethno-nationalist conflict known as The Troubles. Violence continually erupted between Catholic Republicans, who wanted Northern Ireland to reunify with Ireland, and Protestant Unionists, who wanted the region to remain in the UK. Throughout three decades, guerilla warfare-style fighting caused the deaths of nearly 3,500 citizens. The opposing groups finally reached a peace treaty, known as the Belfast Agreement, in 1998. While peace has existed in the region since the treaty, Brexit threatens to throw Northern Ireland back into times of trouble.

Two decades have passed since the Belfast Agreement, yet Northern Ireland remains culturally and politically divided. Monuments like Belfast’s “peace walls” immortalize the region’s violent past. Twenty-one miles long, these walls continue to divide the city’s Catholic Nationalist and Protestant Unionist populations. These barriers—erected in 1969 in attempts to subdue growing political and religious conflict—have defined the city for over half a century. This legacy of division can be observed throughout Belfast: Irish history museums, Gaelic signs, socialist murals, and Irish flags decorate Falls Road, a predominantly Catholic region of the city. One mile north across the peace wall lies Shankhill Road, housing mostly Protestant citizens who frequent pubs like “The Royal Bar.” The vivid contrast between these two populations is tangible.

Because of this stark cultural divide, talks of Irish unification have long remained dormant.  Brexit has recently revived the possibility of a unified Ireland. As the UK prepares to leave the European Union, new trade restrictions have complicated its political relationship with Northern Ireland—Brexit will soon force Northern Ireland to adhere to non-EU trade policies. While seemingly mundane, these new trade regulations leave Northern Ireland in a “catch-22” situation. If it were to leave the EU, Northern Ireland must either impose a harder border with Ireland or create a “sea border” with Britain. Both of these solutions have proven unpopular with Northern Irish residents—leaving a third option: Irish reunification.

Brexit negotiations have created a historic and unprecedented moment for Ireland to unite. Shifting public sentiments, failed solutions to border issues, and overwhelming support for EU membership signal a possible unified future for Ireland. Still, the road to reunification is precarious. A large majority of Unionists still vehemently support Northern Irish membership with the UK. Although Brexit pushes Northern Ireland towards a possible unification vote, it also risks rebirthing the region’s violent past. The increasing support for a Northern Irish referendum will inevitably endanger twenty years of fragile peace.

The Consequence of Borders

Northern Ireland’s present peace is largely attributed to its intentional state of ambiguity. No physical or invisible border divides Ireland and Northern Ireland. In addition, Residents of Northern Ireland can opt to hold either Irish or British citizenship. In essence, “nationalists and Unionists can live together in parallel constitutional realities.” The 1998 Peace Agreement included these provisions to emphasize the duality of the region.

Northern Ireland and Ireland’s intangible border is a relatively new reality. Before the Good Friday Agreement, British security forces set up physical borders and checkpoints between the two regions throughout the 1960’s and 1970’s. These security checkpoints were justifiable, as Republican and Ulster groups regularly caused violent conflict near the border. The 1998 treaty rid the country of the security borders and checkpoints. The current 500-kilometer border between Northern Ireland has over 260 crossings, with tens of thousands of people crossing through them every day. The majority of the crossings are in small towns or villages; people cross the border every day without knowing so.

New Brexit trade policies, however, make this borderless state increasingly difficult to maintain. Because Ireland is still a member of the European Union, different customs rules, regulations, and standards will soon apply in Northern Ireland. Divergences in food and agricultural standards, labor rights, and other areas will inevitably materialize between the two regions. For example, Northern Ireland will soon be able to import beef from countries with lower animal welfare and food safety standards, like the US and Australia; the Republic of Ireland, however, will continue placing a hard ban on them. Thus, problems have arisen regarding how these goods will be regulated when crossing the border. This trade issue has been central to Brexit debates for over two years: besides its obvious economic complications, it threatens to end the current ambiguous state of Northern Ireland.

A plethora of solutions has been proposed to solve Northern Ireland’s new Brexit-related difficulties. First, a border could again be imposed between Ireland and Northern Ireland. Theresa May has consistently promised to avoid a hard border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. Others, like, Conservative party leaders, have advocated for an “invisible border.” This type of border would rely on a technology solution with “highly streamlined customs arrangements.” Increased reliance on technology, combined with local trade exceptions and zero tariff trade deals for local traders, would theoretically restore the promise to maintain Northern Ireland without hard borders.

Both Dublin and the EU, however, have labeled the UK’s invisible border solution as magical thinking. As the UK diverges from EU trade policies, “Ireland will have no choice but to police the border … it will be legally obliged to do so by the EU.” The Irish government has also signaled that any increased infrastructure—new cameras and technology or the reinstatement of border patrols—will revive deeply divisive memories and border tension. If Northern Ireland follows the UK’s plans to abandon EU membership and trade policies, a new border and increased social friction seem inevitable.

Alternatively, some have suggested imposing a border between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK. According to this plan, Northern Ireland could remain in the EU Customs Union while maintaining its political ties to the UK. The UK would then need to carve out a special status for Northern Ireland. With this solution, trade regulations between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland would remain the same, abandoning the need for a border.

Unionists, however, see the creation of a “sea border” between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK as an extreme act of betrayal by Britain. Leaders of the Democratic Unionist Party, a pro-British group, have labeled this “all-island solution” as reckless. Nigel Dodds, the party’s deputy leader, warned that “creating border in the Irish Sea would be gravely destabilising to the UK government” and the region’s general peace.

Both Brexit solutions favor either Unionists or Nationalists, inevitably alienating one group in the region. Residents in Northern Ireland, therefore, remain discontent with the current state of Brexit negotiations. As a result, both Protestants and Catholics alike have begun to envision an alternative future: reunification.

The Moment for Reunification

Before 1998, Northern Ireland had no legal right to reunify with Ireland. England explicitly forbade it, subsequently leading to years of violent protests and thousands of deaths during The Troubles. The Belfast Agreement changed this law, explicitly including a provision guaranteeing residents of Northern Ireland the right to rejoin Ireland through a popular vote. This referendum never gained serious consideration in the two decades of its establishment, though: at the time of its inception, Northern Ireland was still majority Unionist, dissuading public calls for a vote.

Changing demographics, along with the recent Brexit referendum, signal a possible move toward Irish reunification. When Northern Ireland was originally carved out of Ireland, the region was 65% Protestant and 35% Catholic, guaranteeing a Unionist majority; nearly a century later, the region is 48% Protestant, 45% Catholic. While still majority Protestant, changing social patterns and immigration have nearly leveled the power balance in the region. Unionists no longer hold a clear-cut claim over the region’s future.

Brexit has also affected attitudes on reunification in Northern Ireland. Unlike England, Northern Ireland did not vote to leave the EU during the Brexit referendum. 56% of residents in the region voted to remain. After the vote, support for EU membership continued to rise. A recent poll found that 75.8% of Northern Irish believe EU standards should be maintained post-Brexit. In addition, 53% reported they “believe there [would]be a reduction in rights as a result” of leaving the EU.

This desire to remain part of the EU recently resulted in skyrocketing demands for Irish passports. Uncertainty over Brexit is “driving demands for Irish passports in Northern Ireland, with some post offices running out of forms.” Applications for Irish passports increased from 53,715 in 2015 to 84,855 in 2018, staggering 56% increase. Their actions speak loudly; the Northern Irish value their EU membership more than their British history. This new hierarchy of identity is intriguing. While extreme nationalism is on the rise throughout the rest of Europe, many in Northern Ireland are willing to forsake their national identity to maintain their European one.

Unionists are also increasingly supporting the idea of an independent, unified Ireland.. A recent BBC poll revealed that 28% of those who previously supported Northern Ireland’s place in the UK would now vote to join the Republic of Ireland. Unsurprisingly, this shift in Unionist support should almost entirely be attributed to Brexit. Data shows that, if the UK were to remain in the EU, only 28% of people in Northern Ireland would vote for a united Ireland.

In total, most recent polling suggests that 53% of Northern Irish currently support Irish unification if Brexit were to ensue. While not dominating percentage, support for reunification has not reached this level for decades; there has never been a more opportune moment for a referendum. Republicans have seized onto this reality, using Brexit as a rallying point for Irish unification. The moment for reunification is brief and will last only as long as Brexit negotiations are in the air.

An Unstable Future

The possibility of a referendum will not be a painless affair. Despite shifting public opinions and general support for EU membership, Northern Ireland is still culturally divided. Unionists fear that Irish unification will become part of the national political conversation in “ways that it has not been since the partition of Ireland in 1921.” They believe Brexit risks unpicking the carefully, painfully worked-out solutions of the 1998 peace agreement. As a result, Unionists have become increasingly aggressive on their political stances.

A recent poll conducted by the University of Edinburgh found that “87% of [Northern Ireland]’s leave voters would see the collapse of the peace process as an acceptable price for Brexit.” Those who support Brexit—most of whom are Unionists—seem to overwhelmingly value British citizenship over peace in Northern Ireland. If a successful unification vote were to occur, large percentages of Unionists may resort to the kind of violence historically associated with The Troubles. For many Unionists, political identity ultimately remains more important than political stability.

Unionist fears over leaving the UK are not unwarranted. Northern Ireland is not in a financially stable state. It still relies heavily on subsidies from the British government, receiving an annual subvention from Great Britain of around ten billion pounds. These subsidies are necessary, as foreign investment in infrastructure, jobs, and skills are decidedly low. The decision to leave the UK, therefore, would jeopardize Northern Ireland’s financial stability, threatening public-sector employment and health care. Unsurprisingly, then, Unionists seem prepared to take violent action to remain tied to England.

Some Republicans appear equally as willing to resort to violence to obtain their desired state. A car bomb recently exploded in January outside of a courthouse in Londonderry, a Northern Irish city directly on the border. Two members of the Irish Republican Army were later arrested for the bombing. While no casualties resulted from the incident, police reported that the bombing “was a very significant attempt to kill people.” The incident left Northern Ireland shaken, signaling a possible end to the region’s twenty years of peace.

In response to Brexit and growing regional tension, Republican political groups are emerging throughout the country. Many of these groups, such as the socialist group Saoradh, seek to distance themselves from the UK as quickly as possible. In Saoradh’s constitution, the group encourage their fellow Irish men to “fight back against” imperial and capitalist nations “in the struggle to regain our sovereignty.” The groups attract diverse range of Northern Irish, including many former members of the IRA. Saoradh leaders anticipate the construction of a hard Irish border, as they believe its erection would finally encourage the Irish people to take back their country.

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Brexit has ultimately renewed political, cultural, and religious tensions throughout Northern Ireland. Because of the UK’s imminent withdrawal from the EU, Northern Ireland has never faced a more probable moment for a referendum. Uncertainty over Brexit negotiations has increased support in the region for EU membership. In addition, the idea of instituting a hard border with Ireland has proven unpopular among the majority of residents. As a result, both Catholic and Protestant support for a unified Ireland has increased; new polls, campaigns, and passport data signal the new desire to reunify with Ireland. A referendum seems more probable than ever.

A vote for unification, however, would undoubtedly threaten the region’s fragile peace. Violence seems to lurk beneath both Unionist and Republican sentiments. The majority of Unionists appear willing to return to a turbulent political state to maintain their relationship with the UK. Likewise, the revival of extreme Republican coalitions seems reminiscent of the region’s violent IRA past. As the possibility of a referendum increases, so does the likelihood of returning to The Troubles. Unification is possible, but it will not be achieved without the renewal of sectarian tension. Many politicians and academics choose to view Brexit as an economic crisis. It is equally as necessary to consider the potential for this crisis to reignite security issues previously left behind in the twentieth century.

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Nathalie Kiersznowski, a sophomore studying political science and economics, is the magazine director of Stanford Politics.