Stanford Politics

L

ike the rest of Western Europe, Northern Ireland is secularizing fast. Weekly Mass attendance among Catholics has dropped from 90 percent at the start of The Troubles to barely 30 percent in 2017. Other studies have found similar drop in attendance at Protestant churches. Exact data on the number of non-religiously affiliated residents—or ‘nones’—is difficult to ascertain; Northern Ireland’s statistics agency records the religion residents were brought up in rather than their current religious affiliation. Yet the most recent 2018 statistics report notes that the share of Northern Irish residents professing no religious affiliation has risen steadily over the last several years. 

However, unlike the rest of Europe, religious upbringing and affiliation still impact nearly every aspect of life in Northern Ireland. 90 percent of children  still attend a religiously affiliated school, and half of Northern Ireland’s school children are taught in schools where 95 percent or more of the pupils share the same religion. In addition, nearly decade after the signing of the Good Friday Agreement, only 12 percent marriages in Northern Ireland were between members of different religious affiliations. Neighborhoods in cities like Belfast and Derry remain segregated by religious and political identity. Although personal religious belief has declined among Northern Irish residents, the salience of religious cleavages has not. 

What does this unique religious dichotomy mean for a post-Brexit Northern Ireland? The Brexit vote divided Northern Ireland along religious lines, with the majority of Catholics voting to stay in the EU and Protestants voting to leave it. British and Irish politicians fear that repercussions from the Brexit vote may threaten Northern Ireland’s 20 years of fragile peace, as renewed talks of establishing a trade border between Ireland and Northern Ireland have angered the Nationalist and Catholic communities. In response, some point to Northern Ireland’s increasingly secularized population as a hopeful sign towards maintaining peace post-Brexit. As religious belief declines, politicians and militants can no longer use religious rhetoric to appeal to their base. 

This claim has warrant. Despite academic claims that The Troubles were purely about civil rights and colonialism, religious leaders and rhetoric were central to the violence that erupted in the 20th century. Reverend Ian Paisley, highly influential Northern-Irish Evangelical leader, responded to 1960’s Catholic civil rights marches through demonization of the Catholic population. The Reverend used his religious authority to campaign for anti-Catholic and violent political goals, including forcing the resignation of Prime Minister Terrence O’Neill, the first Northern Irish prime minister to seriously address historic discimination against Catholics. As Catholicism contradicts God’s law—Paisley’s logic went—it was necessary to cease its encroachment through any means possible. 

Nationalist militants also used theological appeals to engage with their communities. While most paramilitary groups during The Troubles were secular, militants were cognizant of the relationship between religion and politics. The IRA justified their violence through the Catholic doctrine of Just War. Because they considered the British treatment occupation of Northern Ireland as unjust, the IRA called on Catholics and Nationalists to take up arms as simple matter of self defense. The IRA also used Jesus as a symbolic figure. Catholic Nationalists preached that “Christ promoted social justice…He drove the 600 changers out of the temple. We hope the Irish at home drive the enemy from Ireland.” By portraying Jesus as a fierce revolutionary that challenged institutional structures, the IRA hoped to portray themselves as martyrs to the Catholic population. 

Thus, some believe that the increasing secularization of Northern Ireland is a hopeful sign for peace in the region. Politicians, religious leaders, and militants can no longer rely on invoking religious doctrine to justify their claims. As residents slowly drop their religious affiliations and beliefs, their rationales for supporting conflict may fall as well. 

Relying on a shifting religious demographic to save the region from further violence may be miscalculated, though. Although religious doctrines were evoked during the Troubles to appeal to certain demographics, religion influenced the conflict in far greater ways than providing doctrinal validation for violence. Catholics and Protestants existed in separate social and economic realities during the Troubles, something that continues to exist today. Both Catholic and Protestant churches objected to mixed marriages and mixed religious or secular schools. Business owners did not hide their intentions to solely hire those of the same religion. These objections resulted in a population that rarely had the chance to form meaningful relationships with those of opposing faiths. The different spheres of politics, religion, family, work, and school were not different at all. 

These different spheres are still polarized in Northern Ireland today. Despite a declining level of religious affiliation, Northern Irish residents are still hesitant to enter mixed marriages, send children to secular schools, or live in neighborhoods outside of their religious affiliation. This  polarization has resulted in a lack of spaces where residents of opposing faiths can engage with one another. As a result, very few avenues for conflict resolution and dialogue among residents have emerged since the Troubles. Although religion has diminished as a source of identity among Northern Irisih residents, social polarization has not.

Finally, a secularizing Northern Ireland means a reduced role for religious leaders in communities around the region. Some religious leaders subtly or explicitly supported violence during The Troubles. Yet many others worked to subdue it. Nearly all prominent religious leaders in Northern Ireland have preached for peace and have even criticized members of their own religious affiliation. Priests served as mediators between militants during the Troubles, a role they continue to serve today. As the church loses legitimacy in Northern Ireland, this avenue for conflict resolution may lose credibility as well. An increasingly secularized population may reject Priest’s role in peace making processes, abandoning one of the only avenues for conflict resolution available in Northern Ireland.

Despite higher numbers of religious affiliates compared to both Ireland and the rest of the UK, Northern Ireland is still secularizing. Religious theologies and influences will play a minor—if not nonexistent – role in future violence in the region. Yet the possibility of violence between cleavages still exists.. Religion leaders and theologies primarily added to the carnage of The Troubles by discouraging cross cultural interactions through education, marriage, and work. This historic religious and social polarization ultimately prevented avenues for conflict resolution and cross-cultural understanding to develop. A population with fewer theological beliefs will not prevent the region from experiencing renewed conflict. Community leaders must rather work to break cross-cutting cleavages that continue to stain the region today.